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Pragmatics in Peter John Olivi’s Account 




The aim of this paper is to present a reconstruction of Olivi’s account of signiﬁcation 
of common names and to highlight certain intrusion of pragmatics into this account. 
The paper deals with the question of how certain facts, other than original imposition, 
may be relevant to determine the semantical content of an utterance, and not with the 
question of how we perform actions by means of utterances. The intrusion of pragmat-
ics into Olivi’s semantics we intend to point out may seem minimal today, but was of 
a certain importance at his time. Even if the conventional codes still play a role in his 
explanation of how words acquire a semantical content, both the intention of the 
speaker and the communication context in which this intention is being eﬀectuated 
are essential features of the actual signiﬁcation of names.
Keywords
Peter John Olivi, medieval semantics, medieval pragmatics, medieval philosophy, 
common names
1. Framing the question
Peter John Olivi lived between 1248 and 1298. He was a controversial Fran-
ciscan theologian, who entered his order at the age of 12, studied in Paris 
between 1267 and 1272, and spent the rest of his life teaching in Franciscan 
studia in the south of France. His engagements in thorny debates over matters 
sensitive for the Church made him well known at his time. Perhaps the most 
important of these debates was the one over the poverty of the clergy. As a 
consequence of his radical positions, his academic career stagnated, he was 
summoned to leave Paris without becoming a Master of Theology, and his 
writings were condemned by the Franciscan authorities in 1283.
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From a philosophical perspective, he was no less radical. He was a ﬁerce 
defender of free will as a directive notion of all possible anthropology,1 to the 
point that this notion emerges constantly in his treatment of psychological, 
epistemological and logical matters. His treatment of philosophical issues is 
found in both his Commentary on the Sentences of Peter the Lombard and in a 
set of logical questions written around 1287, the Questiones logicales, which 
are probably a result of his teaching in southern France.2
The main aim of this article is to present a reconstruction of Olivi’s account 
of signiﬁcation of common names and, at the same time, to highlight some 
intrusions of pragmatics into this account. I shall be concerned with the ques-
tion of how certain facts, other than the original imposition, may co- determine 
the semantical content of an utterance; for instance, how the intention of the 
people involved in a conversation and the context in which the conversation 
is taking place may help to determine its content. I shall not, however, be 
concerned with the question of how we perform actions by means of lan-
guage. In order to carry out this reconstruction, I shall mainly focus on the 
questions 4 and 7 of the Questiones logicales,3 as well as on one of the questions 
of Quid ponat ius vel de signis voluntariis.4
1) For the voluntarist anthropology of Olivi, in opposition to Aquina’s intellectualist one, see 
Robert Pasnau, Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages (Cambridge-New York, 1997). A 
detailed study of the notion of free will in Olivi is found in Francois Xavier Putallaz, Insolente 
liberté. Controverses et condamnations au XIIIe siècle (Friburg, 1995); see also Olivier Boulnois 
‘Vouloir, voeu et noblesse de la volonté selon Olieu’, Cahiers du Centre de Recherches Historiques 
16 (1996), 57-64.
2) For a study of Olivi’s life, see David C. Burr, L’histoire de Pierre Olivi: Franciscain persécuté, 
tr. F.X. Putallaz (Friburg, 1976). For a study of his relation to the academic milieu of his time, 
see David C. Burr, ‘Petrus Iohannis Olivi and the Philosophers’, Franciscan Studies 31 (1971). 
Alain Boureau & Sylvain Piron (eds.), Pierre de Jean Olivi (1248-1298): Pensée scolastique, dis-
sidence spirituelle et société (Paris, 1999) contains a collection of essays on Olivi’s philosophical 
and theological works.
3) The questions ask whether the direct meaning of a common name is a concept or a thing and 
whether an equivocal name signiﬁes all its signiﬁcates at the same time (An nomina rerum prius 
et principalius signiﬁcent res vel conceptus intellectus de ipsis rebus and an nomen aequivocum simul 
signiﬁcet omnia sua signiﬁcata). Peter John Olivi, Quaestiones Logicales, ed. S. Brown, Traditio 42 
(1986), 335-388.
4) This question asks whether signiﬁcation adds something real to the physical sign and it is 
found in the Preface to his Commentary on Sentences IV. Its goal is to elucidate whether the 
obligation linked to the institution of a norm is a real relation or a relation of reason (a ratio 
realis or a ratio rationis). Olivi’s position is that the only existing relation is the one established 
between the intentions of the ones instituting the norm and the ones subject to the norm. Then, 
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The intrusion of pragmatics into Olivi’s semantics that I intend to point 
out may seem minimal today, but was of some importance in his time. The 
conventional codes still play a role in his explanation of how words acquire a 
semantical content, but he also maintains that both the intention of users of 
language and the communication context in which these intentions are being 
applied are essential features of the actual signiﬁcation of common names.
My argument will proceed in three steps: ﬁrst, I will present the semiotics 
on which Olivi’s semantic positions are grounded; then, I will go on to the 
exposition of his account of signiﬁcation of common names, and accentuate 
the essential role that the intention of the users plays here; ﬁnally I will con-
sider certain problems posed by equivocal names, in order to allow the entrance 
of the notion of communication context into Olivi’s semantics.
2. The Semiotic Basis
Olivi’s ideas about signiﬁcation are built on a theory of signs of neat Augustin-
ian inspiration. Elements of this semiotics can be found both in the Quaes-
tiones logicales and in Quid ponat ius.
In the fourth question of the Quaestiones logicales, Olivi establishes 
a division of signs according to how they signify. On the one hand, there 
are signs which signify naturally, that is, signs whose signiﬁcative character 
depends on a causal relation between them and their signiﬁcates. Exam-
ples of this kind of sign are complaints of the ill (an example taken from 
the Boethian tradition) and words taken as caused by the concepts and the 
will of the utterer (an example closer to the Augustinian tradition). On the 
other hand, there are signs which signify by the beneplacitum of men, that is, 
signs whose signiﬁcative character depends on an arbitrary decision by those 
instituting them:
One must say that the signiﬁcation of names or utterances is twofold. On the one hand, 
there is a natural one, according to which they signify the causes by means of which they 
are formed and made, together with some other things joined to their forming. And in this 
way they signify primarily the aﬀections and the conceptions of the soul. [. . .] So, the utter-
ances or the sighs of the ill signify naturally their pain, and the terrifying utterances of the 
no real relation is to be found between the norm and the one instituting or the one adopting it. 
See Ferdinand Delorme, ‘Question de J. P. Olivi Quid ponat ius vel dominium ou encore De 
signis voluntariis’, Antonianum 20/1-4 (1945), 309-330. For a detailed study of this question, see 
Rosier 2004. For a study of Olivi’s notion of relation, see Alain Boureau, ‘Le concept de relation 
chez Pierre de Jean Olivi’, in Boureau & Piron (eds.), Pierre de Jean Olivi (1248-1298), 41-56.
 A.M. Mora-Márquez / Vivarium 49 (2011) 150-164 153
ones who growl signify naturally their rage and wrath, and every utterance signiﬁes the will 
to speak which commands its own fulﬁlment. On the other hand, there is a signiﬁcation 
instituted only by an arbitrary decision (beneplacitum) of men. And according to this one, 
utterances signify primarily the things which they are instituted to signify.5
This latter kind of signs we can call, without getting into much trouble, ‘con-
ventional signs’.
In presenting this typology of signs, Olivi does not entirely follow Augus-
tine and his tradition.6 Nonetheless, when discussing the signiﬁcative charac-
ter of conventional signs, he appears to be fully in line with the Augustinian 
semiotical tradition, according to which a physical entity is actually a sign only 
insofar as it is considered as such by an interpreter.7
The signiﬁcation of conventional signs is, thus, twofold: on the one hand, 
they have a dispositional signiﬁcation (habitualiter); on the other, an actual 
signiﬁcation:
One must say that the signiﬁcation of the name is taken in two ways: ﬁrst, dispositionally, 
as it were; second, in act or exercise, as it occurs when [the name] is actually uttered out of 
an intention to signify or when it is written in a certain narration. It has the ﬁrst mode by 
imposition, and the second by being applied to the things to which it is now and was 
[already earlier] imposed.8
5) Dicendum quod duplex est signiﬁcatio nominum sive vocum. Una est naturalis, secundum 
quam signiﬁcant suas causas per quas formantur et ﬁunt et quaedam alia annexa suae formationi. 
Et hoc modo prius signiﬁcant aﬀectus et conceptus animi. [. . .] Unde voces sive suspiria gemen-
tium naturaliter signiﬁcant dolorem eorum et terribiles voces frementium naturaliter signiﬁcant 
furorem et iram eorum et omnis vox signiﬁcat voluntatem loquendi imperantem eius completio-
nem. Alia est signiﬁcatio a solo beneplacito hominum instituta. Et secundum hanc <voces> prius 
signiﬁcant res illas ad quas signiﬁcandas sunt institutae. QL, q.4, p. 346.
6) Augustine divides signs into natural signs and given signs. Roger Bacon will then divide the 
latter into given signs which signify naturally and given signs which signify conventionally. In 
this last typology of signs, cries of pain are given signs signifying naturally, whereas names can 
be seen as natural signs, insofar as they are caused by concepts. Cf. Augustine, De doctrina chris-
tiana, II, I, 2-3 and Irène Rosier, La parole comme acte. Sur la grammaire et le sémantique au XIIIe 
siècle (Paris, 1994), 89-94.
7) Cf. Augustine, De doctrina christiana, II, I, 1 : Signum est enim res praeter speciem, quam 
ingerit sensibus, aliud aliquid ex se faciens in cogitationem venire.
8) Dicendum quod signiﬁcatio nominis dupliciter accipitur: primo scilicet quasi habitualiter; 
secundo in actu aut exercitio, sicut ﬁt cum ex intentione signiﬁcandi actualiter profertur aut cum 
in certa narratione est scriptum. Primum modum habet ex impositione; secundo vero ex appli-
catione ad quae iam est et erat impositum. QL, q.7, p. 353.
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Therefore, conventional signs obtain their dispositional signiﬁcation from an 
act of imposition and their actual signiﬁcation from their use in a communica-
tion context.
In the question Quid ponat ius, Olivi suggests that the act of imposition 
from which dispositional signiﬁcation arises is not the act of a single man 
putting a label, let us say a name, on its signiﬁcate. It is rather the result of a 
common agreement of the members of a linguistic community, to the eﬀect 
that, once a name has been agreed upon by the community to stand for some 
signiﬁcate, its signiﬁcative relation to this signiﬁcate becomes a kind of rule 
that single users of the language are supposed not to break when actually using 
it. Thus, the signiﬁcation of an utterance depends both on the imposition 
determined by the common intention of a community (dispositional signi-
ﬁcation) and on the eﬀective use of the previously imposed utterance (actual 
 signiﬁcation):9
Now, to the point about the duplicity by perjury, one must say that because this or that 
word is commonly and from the common intention or agreement of men ordained to sig-
nify such a thing, nobody can use it on his own authority for another signiﬁcation without 
the deceit of insincerity (dolo simulationis), unless he clearly expresses his intention to the 
listener; so, the reason for the determinate signiﬁcation of utterances is taken not only from 
the actual intention of the speaker, but also from the common and dispositional intention 
of the speakers of that language; so, it is right to say that just as the actual signiﬁcation of 
the word consists in the actual intention of the speaker and in the actual apprehension of 
the listener, in the same way its dispositional signiﬁcation really consists in the dispositional 
and common intention of men.10
Now, neither the dispositional nor the actual signiﬁcation is a real relation 
between the sign and its content. Hence, the only thing that is required for a 
relation of signiﬁcation to hold between a sign and its content is that users 
intend to give such a content to the sign:
 9) We will discuss later (p. 161-163) the implications of this passage with regard to resolution of 
equivocation.
10) Ad illud autem de duplicitate pro periurio dicendum quod, ex quo haec vel illa vox est com-
muniter et a communi intentione seu beneplacito hominum ordinata ad tale quid signiﬁcan-
dum, non potest quis propria auctoritate ea uti ad aliam signiﬁcationem absque simulationis 
dolo, nisi suam intentionem clare exprimat auditori; unde ratio determinatae signiﬁcationis ipsa-
rum vocum non solum sumitur ab actuali intentione loquentis set etiam a communi et habituali 
intentione hominum illius linguae; unde bene dicitur quod, sicut actualis signiﬁcatio vocis est in 
actuali intentione loquentis et in actuali apprehensione audientis, sic eius habitualis signiﬁcatio 
est realiter in communi et habituali intentione hominum. QPI, in Irène Rosier-Catach, La parole 
eﬃcace. Signe, ritual, sacré (Paris, 2004), 180-181.
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As regards voluntary signs, we still have to determine what their signiﬁcation (in the active 
sense of signiﬁcation) posits. And indeed, when you consider it subtly and clearly, you will 
ﬁnd that signiﬁcation adds nothing over and above the real essence of the thing that is 
employed as a sign, except for the mental intention of the ones who institute and accept it, 
and of the person who actually employs that thing to signify and of the one who hears it or 
receives it under the account of such a signiﬁcation or sign.11
Signiﬁcation could be better described as a direction of the attention of the 
users towards a content, a direction that is given by the intentions of both 
speaker and listener. More particularly, actual signiﬁcation takes place when 
the listener decodes a sign uttered by the speaker by directing his attention to 
its intended content. He can eﬀectuate this decoding because he already knows 
what the sign can stand for. To illustrate this last point, it is worth mentioning 
what Olivi has to say about the way we learn what a sign means. Since there is 
nothing in the essence of the physical sign that can lead us to direct our atten-
tion more to one thing than to another, the only way to learn what a sign 
stands for is by means of other signs:
To the seventh [argument], one must say that an utterance has nothing in its nature to 
make it signify one thing rather than another, unless we speak of its natural signiﬁcation 
according to which it naturally signiﬁes its causes. But that is not what we are speaking 
about here. And for this reason the utterance in itself does not imprint its signiﬁcate in the 
listener, nor its signiﬁcation; otherwise, every listener would understand every language and 
its proper signiﬁcations, which is clearly false. On the contrary, a man must ﬁrst know what 
an utterance signiﬁes before, by means of it (or better, occasioned by it), he thinks again of 
the things the speaker intends to signify to him by means of that utterance. So, by means 
of the utterance itself we do not learn its signiﬁcate absolutely, but only in a certain 
respect.12
11) Restat igitur videre de signis voluntariis, quid scilicet ponit ipsorum signiﬁcatio active 
sumpta. Et certe, quanto subtilius et perspicatius illam attenderis, invenies quod supra realem 
essentiam rei quae pro signo assumitur nichil addit ipsa signiﬁcatio, nisi solum mentalem inten-
tionem instituentium et acceptantium, et ipsius qui actu illam rem assumit ad signiﬁcandum et 
eius qui eam audit vel accipit sub ratione talis signiﬁcationis seu talis signi. QPI, in Rosier-
Catach, La parole eﬃcace, 179.
12) Ad septimum dicendum quod vox non habet aliquid in sui natura ex quo plus signiﬁcet hanc 
rem quam illam, nisi loquamur de sua naturali signiﬁcatione secundum quam naturaliter signi-
ﬁcat suas causas. De hac autem hic non loquimur. Et ideo vox ex se non imprimit audienti suum 
signiﬁcatum nec suam signiﬁcationem, alias omnis audiens intelligeret omne idioma et proprias 
signiﬁcationes eorum, quod est aperte falsum; immo oportet quod prius sciat homo quid signi-
ﬁcat talis vox, antequam per ipsam, set potius occasione ipsius, de novo advertat res quas loquens 
intendit sibi per vocem illam signiﬁcare. Unde per vocem ipsam non addiscimus absolute suum 
signiﬁcatum, set solum sub certo respectu. QPI, in Rosier-Catach, La parole eﬃcace, 180.
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Moreover, some signs are more naturally ﬁt to direct the listener’s attention to 
a content, e.g., gestural or deictic signs:
But if you ask how we learn what this or that utterance signiﬁes, one must say that [that 
happens] by means of certain signs which have been given voluntarily [and] have a greater 
connaturality and direction or relation to such signiﬁcates. So a child is taught what the 
utterance ‘wine’ signiﬁes in this way (or in a similar or equivalent way): while saying this 
utterance, we show him with a movement of the eye or a touch of the ﬁnger the thing that 
is called ‘wine’.13
In sum, in Olivi’s treatment of conventional signs and their signiﬁcation, the 
actual relation of signiﬁcation between a conventional sign and its content 
depends entirely on both the intentions of the speaker and the listener actually 
using the sign. Nevertheless, both the speaker and the listener are constrained 
by a certain normativity resulting from the imposition of the sign, so that, as 
we shall see, they are expected to collaborate in a communicative exchange by 
not breaking the rules of use. We will see in what follows to what extent these 
ideas enter into the semantics of common names.
3. Intention of Users and Signiﬁcation of Common Names
In question 4 of his Quaestiones logicales, Olivi treats a problem that is fre-
quently raised in commentaries on the Perihermeneias and in some other lin-
guistic treatises of the 13th century. The problem is whether names signify 
primarily a concept or a thing. His response to this question is in opposition 
to the Boethian tradition, according to which the immediate signiﬁcates of 
names are concepts; external things are only secondarily signiﬁed by means of 
the signiﬁcation of concepts. Olivi’s rejection of the Boethian interpretation 
of De int. 16a3-9 relies heavily on the notion of the intention of users. A com-
mon name signiﬁes whatever we mainly intend to speak about when using 
that name:14
13) Si autem quaeras quomodo secundum hoc addiscimus quid signiﬁcet haec vox vel illa, dicendum 
quod per aliqua signa a voluntate data quae habent maiorem connaturalitatem et directionem 
<vel> aspectum ad talia signiﬁcata. Unde puero docetur quid signiﬁcat haec vox vinum per hoc 
quod dicendo hanc vocem nutu oculi vel tactu digiti ostendimus sibi rem quae appellatur vinum 
aut per aliquam viam consimilem vel equivalentem. QPI, in Rosier-Catach, La parole eﬃcace, 180.
14) We could also intend to speak about our concept of a man, and in that case the name ‘man’ 
would signify the concept and not the thing, given that this intention is made clear.
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And in this way, this name ‘man’ signiﬁes ﬁrst the thing that is a man, because the intention 
of men aims more directly and more primarily at signifying the thing that is a man than any 
other thing. In fact, [this intention] did not impose properly this name to any other thing 
than the thing that is called a man.15
Furthermore, what we mainly intend to speak about determines the content 
of a term when it is actually used in a propositional context:
Now, this is proved, not only from the intention of those imposing names on things, but 
also from the common sense of the expressions. For when we say “a man runs”, we do not 
mean to say that the concept I have of man, or that man insofar as it is in our intellect, runs, 
or that humanity in the abstract runs, but rather that the thing that is a man taken in con-
cretion runs.16
The central role played by the intention of users in determining the content of 
a common name is here grounded on a voluntarism that is taken as an axiom 
in most of Olivi’s theological and philosophical thinking. Against authors 
who establish some kind of priority of intellect over will (his main target is 
Thomas Aquinas), Olivi’s psychology, epistemology and anthropology are all 
built on an axiomatic priority of will over intellect. Will plays a central role in 
his account of knowledge, of decisions-making and, in a more general sense, 
in his deﬁnition of humanity.17
15) Et hoc modo hoc nomen homo prius signiﬁcat rem quae est homo, quia intentio hominum direc-
tius et principalius intendit per hoc nomen homo signiﬁcare rem quae est homo quam aliquid aliud. 
Immo nec imposuit proprie hoc nomen alicui alteri quam rei quae dicitur homo. QL, q.4, p. 346.
16) Hoc autem probatur non solum ab intentione imponentium nomina rebus sed etiam ex 
communi sensu locutionum. Cum enim dicitur “Homo currit” non intendimus dicere quod 
conceptus quem habeo de homine vel homo prout est in intellectu nostro currit aut quod 
humanitas abstracta currit, sed potius quod res quae est homo concretive acceptus currit. QL, 
q.4, p. 347. In the particular case of common names used in a proposition stating facts of reality 
(e.g., the common name ‘man’ when used in the proposition “a man runs”), they signify primar-
ily the external thing because the intention of the speaker is to state a fact about a particular thing 
in the external world and not a fact about its concept (so, in “a man runs”, Olivi says, the inten-
tion of the speaker is to aﬃrm that a real man, and not his concept, runs). One cannot but be 
surprised by this argument, given that Olivi is well acquainted with a theory of supposition oﬀer-
ing suﬃcient tools to explain how ‘man’ stands for a real man in the proposition “a man runs”, 
no matter what its signiﬁcate is. In fact, ‘man’ could stand for an actual man, according to its 
personal supposition, while still signifying its concept or its abstracted essence according to a 
more primitive semantical property of the name, i.e., signiﬁcation. It does not come as a sur-
prise, then, that the use of this argument against the Boethian interpretation of De int. 16a3-9 is 
contested by Scotus in his own commentaries on this Aristotelian treatise. Cf. Duns Scotus, In 
primum Perih., q. 2, p. 54, 20-26. (St. Bonaventure edition).
17) So, for Olivi man is essentially free, and not essentially rational, as Aquinas claims.
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The aspect of this voluntarism that has the most immediate consequences 
for Olivi’s semantics is the epistemological one. Olivi rejects the Aristotelian 
epistemological tradition according to which in the act of non-propositional 
cognition, external things are eﬃcient causes and the faculties of the soul are 
receptive. In opposition to this, Olivi adopts an epistemology going back to 
Augustine. According to this, every act of cognition follows the scheme will-
apprehension-memory described in Augustine’s De trinitate. This epistemol-
ogy goes together with a psychology where all the intellectual faculties of the 
soul are essentially active and directed by will. This means that in the case of 
non-propositional cognition, will and intellect are the eﬃcient causes, while 
external things are merely terminative causes.
Olivi’s epistemological position is fundamental to his account of signiﬁca-
tion, since he commits himself to the principle that modus signiﬁcandi sequitur 
modum intelligendi:
I respond that even if names of things are imposed in order to signify things, nevertheless 
they are imposed on things only insofar as they are apprehended by the intellect, and in the 
way in which the intellect wants the things that it has apprehended to be signiﬁed.18
Thus, names signify in a manner that follows a certain mode of apprehension.
When answering the question about the univocity of names as far as being 
and not being are concerned, he puts forth the following argument:
M. The way of signifying follows the way of apprehending.
m. We apprehend things without any consideration of time and actual existence.
C. Therefore, we signify them as abstracted from time and actual existence:
Now, ﬁrstly, that indeed names do not signify by themselves present, past or future in the 
thing, but the thing insofar as it is abstracted from them by means of the intellect, this is 
now proved with ﬁve arguments : [. . .] Second, from the relation of consequence between 
mode of signifying and mode of apprehending, for the mode of signifying follows the mode 
of apprehending. Now, it is a fact that we commonly apprehend names and the absolute 
signiﬁcates of names without relation to any time or place.19
18) Respondeo quod licet nomina rerum sint imposita ad signiﬁcandum res, non tamen sunt 
imposita rebus nisi prout sunt apprehensae ab intellectu et sub illo modo sub quo intellectus vult 
res se intellectas signiﬁcari. QL, q.1, p. 338. One should stress that Olivi’s use of modus signiﬁ-
candi is not the technical one of the modistic grammar.
19) Primum autem, quod scilicet nomina non signiﬁcant ex se praesens, praeteritum vel futurum 
secundum rem, sed prout est per intellectum abstracta ab eis, probatur ad praesens quintuplici 
ratione: [. . .] Secunda est consequentia <modi> signiﬁcandi ad modum intelligendi. Modus enim 
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The commonness of signiﬁcation of names depends on their following an act 
of apprehension which does not consider the individuating conditions of 
things, but only their proper deﬁnition. This act of apprehension, which is the 
equivalent of a concept in Olivi’s theory, is neither a species intelligibilis nor a 
quality of the soul resulting from this act and diﬀerent from it. In his De verbo, 
Olivi rejects the idea, attributed by him to Thomas Aquinas,20 that the con-
cept is something diﬀerent from the act of apprehension itself and from the 
species that initiates this act. In contrast to this, Olivi’s concept is not the result 
of the act of apprehension, nor does this act require any species intelligibilis to 
get started.21 To posit such obstacles in the cognitive access to the world 
amounts to putting into question the freedom of the human soul, Olivi argues. 
Therefore, the concept must be identical with the act of apprehension, an act 
that is directed by the will to its terminative object, e.g., an external thing. 
Now, if names arise in accordance with this will-directed kind of  apprehension 
that does not consider inviduating conditions of the external thing, they will 
signify it in a common manner, i.e., they will be common names.22
In other authors (e.g., authors from the Modist school), the formula modus 
signiﬁcandi sequitur modum intelligendi is combined with the idea that the 
mode of apprehension follows a mode of being. In the case of the common 
name, the commonness in signiﬁcation follows both a commonness in appre-
hension and a commonness in being. Olivi, on the contrary, does not admit 
any commonness in the realm of being. Commonness of signiﬁcation follows 
signiﬁcandi sequitur modum intelligendi. Constat autem quod nos saepe intelligimus nomina et 
absoluta signiﬁcata nominum absque relatione ad aliquod tempus vel locum. QL, q.1, p. 340.
20) It is not certain that Aquinas actually adopted the theory attributed to him by Olivi. See John 
J. Haldane, ‘The Life of Signs’, The Review of Metaphysics 47/3 (1994), 451-470; John P. 
O’Callaghan, ‘The Problem of Language and Mental Representation in Aristotle and St. Thomas’, 
The Review of Metaphysics 50/3 (1997), 499-545 and Id., ‘Concepts, Beings and Things in Con-
temporary Philosophy and Thomas Aquinas’, The Review of Metaphysics 53/1 (1999), 69-98. For 
other studies about Aquinas theory of concept, see Giorgio Pini, ‘Species, Concept and Thing: 
Theories of Signiﬁcation in the Second Half of the Thirteenth Century’, Medieval Philosophy and 
Theology 8 (1997), 21-52; Claude Panaccio, Le discours intérieur (Paris, 1999), 177-201 and Id., 
‘Aquinas on Intellectual Representation’, in Dominik Perler (ed.), Ancient and Medieval Theories 
of Intentionality (Leiden etc., 2001), 185-201.
21) Olivi is not the ﬁrst scholastic to reject the species intelligibilis as the formal principle of the 
act of apprehension. In fact, an earlier rejection of this entity is found in Henry of Ghent (q. 14, 
Quodlibet V). Henry is also a ﬁerce defender of the active character of the intellectual faculties. 
For Henry’s rejection of the species, his epistemology and philosophy of mind, see Leen Spruit, 
Species intelligibilis: from perception to knowledge, vol. I: Classical roots and medieval discussions 
(Leiden etc., 1994).
22) For a study of Olivi’s notion of intentionality, see Dominik Perler, Théories de l’intentionnalité 
au Moyen-Age (Paris, 2003).
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a commonness in the act of apprehension which has no counterpart in reality. 
It is, however, not totally independent of reality, as it is based on something 
that he calls rationes reales.
These rationes reales can be understood as notions that the intellect grasps 
from particularized essences of things, without this implying that they are 
pure ﬁctions of the intellect. They are rationes in the sense that they are an 
intellectual perspective on things, but they are also reales in the sense that this 
perspective is based on the things themselves. The intellect can choose among 
several perspectives when apprehending a thing, but the number of perspec-
tives is limited by the ways in which the world is arranged. Yet, these ways of 
intellectual apprehension do not amount to modes of being:
The response to the third [argument] is twofold. First, that dispositional being diﬀers from 
actual being, however not really, as if there were diverse real beings existing in things. They 
only diﬀer according to diverse rationes or modes, because dispositional being belongs to 
the thing insofar as [the thing] is apprehensible without simultaneous apprehension of its 
actual existence.23
Olivi’s use of the formula modus signiﬁcandi sequitur modum intelligendi is, 
therefore, to be understood as follows: the mode of signiﬁcation of a word 
follows the way in which the speaker has chosen to cognitively approach the 
thing he wants to speak about, without this implying that he could have cho-
sen just any way whatsoever. Hence, Olivi interprets the statement ‘words 
signify the things insofar as they are in the intellect’ as saying: ‘the thing is 
signiﬁed according to the real ratio according to which it is an object of the 
person apprehending and communicating’:
To the second [argument], one must say that ‘things are signiﬁed insofar as they are in the 
intellect’ can be understood in two ways. First in the sense that only what they posit in the 
intellect is signiﬁed by their names. And in this way the proposition is false which states 
that names signify things insofar as they are in our intellect, rather than insofar as they are 
themselves in act. Secondly, it can be understood in the sense that the thing is signiﬁed 
according to its real ratio according to which it is the object of the one who understands and 
talks rather than according to all the rationes it has from without in its actual existence, and 
in this way the proposition is true.24
23) Ad tertium dupliciter respondetur: Primo, quod esse habitualee diﬀert ab esse actuali, non 
quidem realiter, quasi sint diversa esse realia in rebus exsistentia, sed solum diﬀerunt secundum 
diversas rationes sive modos, quia esse habituale convenit rei prout est intelligibilis absque coin-
telligentia suae actualis exsistentiae. QL, q.3, p. 345.
24) Ad secundum dicendum quod res signiﬁcari prout sunt in intellectu potest dupliciter intel-
ligi: Primo scilicet quod illud quod ponunt in intellectu solum signiﬁcatur per nomina eorum. 
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This amounts to saying that the apprehension of the external thing is an epis-
temological and not a semantic condition for its signiﬁcation. The axiomatic 
role that will plays in Olivi’s philosophical thinking leads him to reject both 
universals in re and universals post rem. The consequence which is important 
for us is that, in Olivi’s account of signiﬁcation, the intention of users plays 
the central role of determining both the semantical content a name actually 
conveys and its mode of signiﬁcation. Both choices are, of course, limited by 
some rules of use imposed by the institution of words and by the ways in 
which a potential signiﬁcate allows itself to be approached by the intellect. I 
submit that this emphasis on the intention of users in Olivi’s account of sig-
niﬁcation of common names constitutes a ﬁrst intrusion of pragmatics into 
Olivi’s semantic ideas.
4. Equivocal names
A second intrusion is found in his discussions of equivocal names, where the 
communication context appears to play an important role in the resolution of 
equivocation.25
As we have seen, a physical sign is not, according to its own essence, directed 
to any particular kind of thing and it can, therefore, be instituted by imposi-
tion to signify anything whatsoever. Therefore, nothing prevents it from being 
instituted by imposition to signify several things. Olivi admits, then, the 
possibility of equivocation from the point of view of dispositional signiﬁca-
tion. But given that both the speaker and the listener are constrained by the 
Et hoc modo falsa est propositio illa qua dicitur quod nomina potius signiﬁcant res prout sunt 
<in> nostro intellectu quam prout sunt actu in se ipsis. Secundo potest intelligi quod res potius 
signiﬁcatur secundum illam rationem suam realem secundum quam est obiectum intelligentis et 
loquentis quam secundum omnes rationes quas extrinsecus habet in sua exsistentia actuali, et 
hoc modo vera est propositio illa. QL, q.4, ad 2, p. 347.
25) Sten Ebbesen, ‘Can equivocation be eliminated?’, Studia Mediewistyczne 18 (1977), 105-
124; Id., ‘Is “Canis currit” ungrammatical ? Grammar in Elenchi Commentaries’, Historiographia 
Linguistica VII (1980), 53-68; and Costantino Marmo, ‘A Pragmatic Approach to Language in 
Modism’, in Sten Ebbesen (ed.), Sprachtheorien in Spätantike und Mittelalter (Tübingen, 1995), 
169-183 have pointed out some authors, such as Duns Scotus, Radulphus Brito and the Anony-
mous from Prague, who have dealt with the question of equivocation in a way similar to Olivi’s. 
Other treatments of equivocation in the 13th Century can be found in E. Jennifer Ashworth, 
‘Analogy and Equivocation in Thirteenth Century Logic: Aquinas in Context’, Mediaeval Stud-
ies 54 (1992), 94-135; Ead., ‘A Thirteenth-Century Interpretation of Aristotle on Equivocation 
and Analogy’, in Aristotle and His Medieval Interpreters, eds. Richard Bosley & Martin Tweedale, 
Canadian Journal of Philosophy (Supplementary Volume) 17 (1992), 85-101.
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impossibility of apprehending more than one thing at the same time, equivo-
cation cannot be actualized either by the speaker or by the listener. When the 
speaker utters a name, he can intend it to convey only one of its possible 
signiﬁcates to the listener, and the listener, in his turn, can interpret the sign 
as conveying only one of these possibilities.
The potential equivocation of the name still leaves open the possibility of 
linguistic misunderstandings between its users, e.g., when the content the 
speaker intends to convey when using that word does not match the one the 
listener grants to it. This situation is, however, generally avoided because of 
what Olivi calls ‘the force of the narration or of the sentence’. He does not 
treat in depth what this ‘force’ consists in. However, he seems to suggest that 
the dispositional signiﬁcation of a given name brings with it some constraints 
on its use in a context. When a name is put in the frame of a communication 
context, the listener is somehow led by these constraints to interpret the 
speaker’s intention in a way that makes sense. In other words, in a regular 
conversation, some rules of use demand a determinate interpretation on the 
part of the listener of the intention of the speaker:
One must say that any of the listeners applies [the name], with his proper application or 
intention, to the signiﬁcate he then conceives by means of it. And that is why the same 
name is somehow multiplied in several people applying it and conceiving it in diﬀerent 
ways. Nevertheless, insofar as it belongs only to the speaker and the writer, it has properly 
only one signiﬁcate, and if the force of the narration or of the phrase demands only that 
one, it can never be rightly applied, in the listeners, to another thing.26
Thus, even if the dispositional signiﬁcation of names allows the possibility of 
equivocation, in regular cases the rules of use will prevent  misunderstandings 
in a communication context, by demanding just one interpretation on the 
part of the listener.
Nonetheless, Olivi admits that it is possible for speakers to aim at deceiving 
or misleading the listener: they can utter the name in a way (for example using 
a particular word order) which demands a particular content, while intending 
it to have another:
26) Ad primum igitur primae partis dicendum quod quilibet auditorum propria applicatione sive 
intentione applicat illud ad illud signiﬁcatum quod tunc per ipsum concepit. Et ideo in diversis 
diversimode illud applicantibus et concipientibus est ipsum nomen quodammodo multiplica-
tum. Prout tamen est solius proferentis et scribentis, non habet proprie nisi unum signiﬁcatum, 
et si vis narrationis sive orationis solum illud exigit, numquam potest in audientibus recte ad 
aliud applicari. QL, q.7, p. 353.
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One must say that even if the speaker can intend that the listeners take it with one or 
another signiﬁcation, nonetheless he cannot intend that he himself actively signiﬁes diverse 
things by means of it. However, it can happen that because of the order and propriety of 
narration [the name] signiﬁes rightly one thing in virtue of the common acception, and 
that he himself intends to signify another thing by speaking with bad faith.27
Therefore, Olivi seems to be well aware of the fact that a speaker can also devi-
ate from the common uses of language. This should not be the case, however, 
and so a collaboration between speaker and listener is to be expected in the act 
of communication. The common uses of language which result from com-
munitarian agreements somehow restrain the freedom of choice of speakers 
when determining the content of a word; and if a speaker intends to convey a 
content that would be unusual in the given context, he will be speaking with 
dolo simulationis, unless he makes clear why he is deviating from the common 
use.28 Thus, the treatment of equivocation reveals a feature of Olivi’s seman-
tics where the content of an utterance is ultimately determined by the context 
and a collaboration between its users, rather than by the original imposition, 
or impositions.
The consideration of a communication context and of a collaboration 
between the users of language constitute, then, the second intrusion of prag-
matics into Olivi’s account of the signiﬁcation of common names.
5. Conclusion
Admittedly, Olivi’s account of signiﬁcation of common names is, in some 
ways, not totally original. The emphasis on the intention of users and the 
consideration of the communication context as determining factors in the act 
of signifying are also present in Bacon’s semiotics and semantics and are 
strongly suggested by Augustine, both in the De doctrina christiana and in the 
De magistro. The intrusion of pragmatics into Olivi’s semantics has, therefore, 
27) Ad tertium dicendum quod licet proferens possit intendere quod auditores accipiant illud 
sub alia et alia signiﬁcatione, non potest tamen intendere quod ipse active per ipsum signiﬁcet 
diversa. Fieri tamen potest quod ex ordine et proprietate narrationis unum ex vi communis 
acceptionis signiﬁcet recte et ipse proferens aliud doloso corde signiﬁcare intendat. QL, q.7, 
p. 353.
28) See above, n. 11.
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at least two historical precedents. The inﬂuence of Augustine on Olivi is obvi-
ous, but there is no reason to think that Bacon has exerted any.29
What is original about Olivi is that he articulates these elements with both 
an epistemology built on a priority of will over intellect and an ontology 
of particulars and rationes reales. The result of putting these three layers 
together is an account of signiﬁcation that is, as far as we know, unique in the 
13th century and that presents us with a thinker with a somewhat dynamic 
conception of language.
Olivi is well aware of the fact that, when using a name in a context, the 
users of language have more choices than the content determined by a ﬁrst 
and unique act of imposition. Names can legitimately be equivocal, so that the 
resolution of equivocation and the eﬀectiveness of communication depend 
more on an expected collaboration between listener and speaker than on for-
mal rules of disambiguation.
He does not want to commit himself to ontological and/or epistemological 
positions which restrict human actions in general, and the act of communica-
tion in particular. And the consequence of this is that both the intentions of 
the speaker and of the listener, together with the context, play a central role in 
his semantic accounts.
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